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ABSTRACT
Degrowth refers to a radical politico-economic reorganisation that
leads to smaller and more equitable social metabolisms. Degrowth
posits that such a transition is indispensable but also desirable.
However, the conditions of its realisation require more research. This
article argues that critical agrarian studies (CAS) and degrowth can
enrich each other. The Agrarian Question and the Growth Question
should be addressed in concert. While degrowth should not fall into
the ‘agrarian myth’, CAS should not embrace the ‘myth of growth’,
even when green and socialist. Ideas of one philosopher and four
agrarian economists are presented, with illustrations from Bhutan,
Cuba and North America, hoping to oﬀer a preliminary research
agenda for ‘agrarian degrowth’.
KEYWORDS
Sustainability; anarchism;
Marxism; agrarian and
environmental justice;
Bhutan; Cuba
1. Introduction
Compounding growth, environmental degradation, and widespread alienation are the three
most dangerous contradictions for our time.
– David Harvey (2015, 57–8)
If the spectre of communism was haunting Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, even
though ‘all the powers of old Europe [had] entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this
spectre’ (Marx and Engels 2011 [1848], 61), it is perhaps the spectre of degrowth that is
today haunting the industrialised world, while all the imperial powers tend to deny the
urgency of the situation (Akbulut et al. 2019). For the economic élites, the lack of growth
is a most frightening idea, but for other people, degrowth may represent a way out, a ‘con-
crete utopia’ (Latouche 2009; Muraca 2017) from which alternatives can be rethought.
The current state of our Biosphere does not indeed look good, and the measures taken
are grossly insuﬃcient. We are reaching the peak of raw materials that are foundational to
our economies, such as oil and phosphorous, while myriads of ecosystems have been
damaged beyond repair and are no longer able to absorb our emissions and waste, as
evident in the phenomenon of climate change (Steﬀen et al. 2011). On the socioeconomic
front, things look hardly better. Disconnected from ecological reality, capitalism continues
to deploy its inbuilt tendency to grow and seek new accumulation opportunities, both vir-
tually (ﬁnancialization) and materially (extraction and production). Debts and derivatives
have reached unparalleled levels worldwide, increasing the risk of economic meltdown
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(Durand 2017). Relative poverty is on the rise everywhere (WIR 2018), while global GDP
shows no sign of absolutely decoupling from ecological impacts (Hickel and Kallis 2019).
Not unsurprisingly, then, more and more people and movements are starting to question
the world’s trajectory of maldevelopment (to borrow Samir Amin’s word), not only from
an environmental and economic perspective, but also politically and existentially. Among
these diﬀerent mobilizations, degrowth is steadily emerging as a central counter-narrative.
This article argues that critical agrarian studies (CAS) and degrowth can bring essential
elements to each other, and that the bridges have so far remained too rare (but see
Roman-Alcalá 2017; Gomiero 2018; Scheidel, Ertör, and Demaria forthcoming). The word
‘degrowth’ only appeared four times in JPS, and always in passing (except in Martínez-
Alier et al. 2016, where it occupies a small paragraph). In reverse, a recent overview of
the ﬁeld of degrowth (D’Alisa, Demaria, and Kallis 2014) does not explicitly mention any
distinct CAS sources and remains sketchy on agricultural issues. This lack of communi-
cation is surprising because the Agrarian Question, after all, is about the deployment of
capitalist growth in the countryside and about how to transition to egalitarian alternatives.
Additionally, the political economy of land and food is a central concern for degrowth
scholars, and so have been other traditional strongholds of CAS, like agroecology and pro-
ductive ‘sovereignties’ as in food sovereignty. But beyond their mutual overlaps, the two
ﬁelds can also usefully address each other’s blind spots. Degrowthers should be wary not
to fall into various versions of the ‘agrarian myth’ and base their alternative models on
naïve ideas about ‘peasant economies’.1 Similarly, CAS scholars should be careful not to
endorse the pervasive ‘myth of growth’ – even when green and socialist – according to
which the constant development of the productive forces ultimately leads to more
welfare and can decouple from ecological impacts with appropriate technologies.
Building on these elements, the present article seeks to bring the ﬁelds of degrowth
and CAS closer, or to bridge the Agrarian Question with the Growth Question. I deﬁne
the latter with the following basic interrogations: what are the eﬀects of growth ‘on the
ground’? Who beneﬁts from it and until what point? What are the alternatives and who
will support them? To me, the Growth Question needs to be incorporated at the core of
the Agrarian Questions (see also Gerber and Veuthey 2010).
I will start with a short exposition of some of the key problems with growth and with a
brief presentation of what degrowth is and is not. After that, the core of the article will
explore fundamental connections between CAS and degrowth through the contribution
of one philosopher and four agrarian political economists. I contend that the approach
of these ﬁve authors, taken together, provide an already fairly coherent glimpse at what
research and activism in ‘agrarian degrowth’ might look like. The key ideas are Simone
Weil’s notion of rootedness within limits, Alexander Chayanov’s multiple balances of repro-
duction, Joseph Kumarappa’s democratic decentralisation, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s
social metabolism, and Joan Martínez-Alier’s alliance between environmental justice and
degrowth. These ideas will, as much as possible, be illustrated with empirical examples,
and especially with vignettes from Bhutan, North America and Cuba. I am not normatively
endorsing every aspect of each of these authors’ work or of each case study; my goal is
1Today’s version of the ‘agrarian myth’ refers to an unspeciﬁed ‘older time’ when undiﬀerentiated peasant communities
generated eco-friendly knowledges, values and practices, while the subsequent fall from grace came with urbanization,
globalisation and the rise of the modern state and its doctrines of development and modernisation (Brass 2000).
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simply to show that they all raise crucial questions for ‘agrarian degrowth’. I then suggest
some lines for future research and end with a few remarks.
2. Where are we and what next?
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears.
– Antonio Gramsci (quoted in Weis 2010, 332)
2.1. What is wrong with economic growth?
The ideology of growth – or growthism – is at the core of capitalism. Growthism sustains
capitalism politically because it allows avoiding redistribution by giving the impression
that everyone will continually beneﬁt from it. Growthism paciﬁes class struggle while jus-
tifying existing structures of inequality (Schmelzer 2016). This ideological function of
growth can be observed in mainstream economic theory too, as for example in the
Kuznets curve narrative (Palma 2011). The latter acknowledges that problems of inequality
and ecological destruction may increase during the initial stages of developments, but it
posits their resolution in the near future thanks to accrued economic growth. In the West,
growth was instrumental to diﬀuse demands of the workers’ movement, in the East, to
excuse the lack of democracy and worker control (Dale 2012), and in the South, to
justify dispossession and extractivism (Gerber and Raina 2018b). Today, GDP growth
remains the key stabilising mechanism of capitalist economies.
Apologists of growth regularly claim that it will be able to ‘dematerialize’, and hence
become ‘green’, with the advancement of cleaner or more eﬃcient technologies and with
renewable energies (see e.g. UNEP 2011). However, to date, no country has experienced
an absolute reduction in material use while growing (taking trade into account) and no
trends indicate that this will occur anytime soon (Hickel and Kallis 2019). As a result, it is
highly improbable to envisage eﬀective climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth
(Jackson 2016). Some scenarios estimate that it is possible, but their models typically
assume some kind of ‘magical’ technical ﬁx after 2050 (Kallis et al. 2018).
Furthermore, the relationship between growth and well-being are complex and open to
debate. In industrialised countries, the increase in self-reported well-being typically stag-
nated somewhere between 1950 and 1970, or even turned into a negative trend, despite a
steady growth in GDP since then (Layard 2005). Good levels of well-being are achieved by
countries such as Cuba and Vietnam – two countries led by communist parties – at a frac-
tion of the output, energy and resource use of countries like the USA. However, even these
lower levels of resource use could not be extended to the entire world over the long-term.
No country currently satisﬁes social well-being standards while staying within its share of pla-
netary boundaries (O’Neill et al. 2018). But nothing indicates that this is an impossible goal,
even in the developing world. Some radical changes are thus clearly needed.
2.2. What is degrowth?
Degrowth is a ﬁeld of scientiﬁc research and activism that starts with the recognition that
the ﬂows of material and energy used in the global economy are unequally distributed and
often massively oversized, especially in industrialised countries. A radical reorganisation
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and resizing of our economies is thus needed if equity and sustainability are to be taken
seriously. The fundamental degrowth proposition is that it is possible to live well in ega-
litarian societies with much smaller resource throughputs (Latouche 2009; Pallante 2011;
Kallis 2018; Schmelzer and Vetter 2019).
The ideas behind degrowth are old and have roots in many parts of the world.2 But
as a slogan in social movements, the word itself was ﬁrst used in France (‘décroissance’)
in the early 2000s and it then rapidly spread elsewhere. It became a focus of scientiﬁc
research at the end of the same decade. The term was originally not a concept but a
‘missile word’ that would trigger discussions on limits, hit at the core of capitalist moder-
nity, and re-politicise the false technocratic and pro-market consensus around ‘sustainable
development’ and ‘green growth’.3 There are four immediate sources to the modern
notion of degrowth (Demaria et al. 2013): ﬁrst, the radical western environmental
movement of the 1960s and 70s, with two famous women in particular, Rachel Carson
who wrote Silent Spring in 1962 and Donella Meadows who coordinated The Limits to
Growth report in 1972; second, the political, cultural and existential critique of capitalist
modernity, as in the works of Erich Fromm and Cornelius Castoriadis; third, the heterodox
current of ecological economics, and particularly the work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
as we will see below; and fourth, the critique of ‘development’ seen not as a liberation
process but as the continuation of western capitalist hegemony, with the works of
Arturo Escobar or Ivan Illich.
Degrowth thus goes much beyond the ecological critique of GDP growth and includes a
broader reﬂection on what constitutes an existentially meaningful mode of co-existing. Its
answer has to do with concepts like sharing, commoning, caring, healing, horizontality,
conviviality and simplicity – notions that can all have subversive implications when
taken seriously. Deﬁned in this way, the ideas behind degrowth go also beyond the Euro-
pean origin of the label and beyond the four modern sources I just mentioned. It is
obviously in industrialised countries that metabolic ﬂows and imperialism need to be
tackled the most urgently, but growthism and the resulting maldevelopment have also
taken solid roots in the global South. There is therefore scope for creative and radical
measures beyond growthism in the global South as well (see e.g. Gerber and Raina
2018b; Kothari et al. 2019).
Contemporary systems of production/consumption have been the object of perhaps
four major critiques from the radical Left. In a nutshell, the latter has problematised
capitalism as in Marxism, capitalism and any state as in anarchism, developmentalism
as in post-development theory, and, most recently, growthism as in degrowth. Of
course, one does not have to stick to one critique since they may all complement
each other well. But from this perspective, the degrowth critique is arguably broader
than the classical Marxist one because it includes the critique of any growthism.
‘Growth is the child of capitalism’, noted Kallis (2018, 73), ‘but the child outdid the
parent, with the pursuit of growth surviving the abolition of capitalist relations in
2The word ‘degrowth’ was ﬁrst used in the modern sense in 1972 by French political ecologist André Gorz (Demaria et al.
2013), but one could look for older related concepts (since ‘degrowth’ is so closely linked to GDP). The term ‘post-indus-
trialism’, for example, was coined in 1914 by Ceylonese philosopher Ananda Coomaraswamy (Marien 1977; Calmé and
Taleb 2017). Going much further, Latouche (2016) argued that Lao Tzu (6th c. BC) is an early proponent of degrowth in his
defence of simplicity and autonomy, his refusal of the superﬂuous, and his critique of existing power.
3The word has been criticised for being economistic, ‘negative’ and/or Eurocentric (see e.g. Drews and Antal 2016).
238 J.-F. GERBER
socialist countries’. Today, very diﬀerent political movements and regimes share the ima-
ginary of permanent economic growth. However, this has not been the case of anar-
chism and post-development theory, two currents of thinking that have had a
profound inﬂuence on degrowth.
Just like Marxism classically seeks to generate ‘socialism’ or ‘communism’, what sort of
systemic alternative does degrowth seek to give birth to? The labelling exercise is open
to discussion and many degrowthers would not ﬁnd it useful, but ‘eco-municipalism’
could be a candidate. The term is regularly seen in the social ecology literature
(Gerber and Romero 2014) and was praised by Latouche (2009). It originally refers to a
multi-level network of egalitarian and sustainable communal entities governed by
direct democracy. The term resonates well with other non-Western candidates like Shri-
vastava and Kothari’s (2012) ‘radical ecological democracy’. The term also nicely trans-
cends the urban and the rural as well as the local and the nation-state while
excluding none.
***
Before pursuing further, I will try to brieﬂy clarify six common misunderstandings about
degrowth. First, degrowth is not just about reversing GDP growth rates. This phenomenon
already has a name and it is called a recession. The point of degrowth is not to have ‘less of
the same’, but to organise appropriation, extraction, production, distribution, consumption
and waste diﬀerently. Second, degrowth is not about imposing ‘austerity’ everywhere and
shrinking ‘everything’. Some items (like local products) will surely be consumed and pro-
duced much more in a degrowth society, and many economic activities will increase in
such a society (like agroecology, urban gardening, and so on). Third, degrowth is not
anti-technology. After almost two centuries of extraordinary technological progress (and
also disruptions), degrowthers simply advocate for the right to choose what to take and
what to leave behind. Fourth, degrowth is not just about celebrating the local. Small
can be beautiful, but not always, as we will also see below. In fact, serious post-growth
thinking can only be world-systemic – and therefore internationalist – because socio-
metabolic ﬂows are globally so unequally distributed and dimensioned. Fifth, degrowth
is not soluble in capitalism. There are diﬀerent currents within post-growth thinking
(e.g. steady state economics, agrowth, post-GDP) and not all of them are post-capitalist,
but degrowth is.
Finally, degrowth is not anti-Marxist, but it is against a certain Marxism that has a blind
faith in industrial productivism, technological progress, and modern science as the only
valid source of knowledge. To give just one example, Leon Trotsky was a formidable
thinker, but his futurist eagerness of 1924 sounds today rather frightening:
Faithmerely promises tomovemountains; but technology, which takes nothing ‘on faith’, is actu-
ally able to cut downmountains andmove them.Up to now this was done for industrial purposes
(mines) or for railways (tunnels); in the future this will be done on an immeasurably larger scale,
according to a general industrial and artistic plan. Man will occupy himself with re-registering
mountains and rivers, and will earnestly and repeatedly make improvements in nature. In the
end, he will have rebuilt the earth, if not in his own image, at least according to his own taste.
(quoted in Foster 2017, 2)
Since critical agrarian studies (CAS) have been profoundly inﬂuenced by Marxism, the next
section on Simon Weil will continue exploring the relations between Marxism, degrowth
and CAS.
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3. Bridging CAS and degrowth: one philosopher and four agrarian
economists
We see the need to dream for more radical change than contemporary politics oﬀers.
– Patel and Moore (2017, 41; quoted in Borras 2019, 20)
3.1. Simone Weil: rootedness within limits
Marxism and the important branch of CAS that claims the Marxist tradition have usually
not, of course, been about degrowth but about socialist growth. However, this does not
imply that the critique of endless growth has never been made by the revolutionary
Left. The thought of Simone Weil (1909–1943), a French philosopher, activist and
mystic, is an early and remarkable example of this. Already in the 1930s, she denounced
the violence of industrialism that ‘uproots’ workers and peasants, denies limits, and
negates the material and immaterial ‘necessities’ of the body and the soul.4
After graduating in philosophy and while working in revolutionary trade-unionism, she
spent long periods of time as a factory worker and as an agricultural labourer in order to
better understand the condition of the working class. She took part in the Spanish revolu-
tion alongside the anarchists and participated in the French resistance before dying in
London at age 34. Her short and busy life did not, however, prevent her from writing
extensively. She can be seen as a precursor not only of political ecology but also of
degrowth – albeit without, of course, using the term. Her own political evolution shows
how her ‘degrowth’ ideas were nourished by Marxism, but also how they began to diﬀer-
entiate in some important respects (Azam and Valon 2016). Weil’s thought is therefore an
entry point into the relationship between Marxism and degrowth as well as into
degrowth’s existential critique of industrial modernity, including in the rural world.
Against Marx, she did not believe that the constant development of the productive
forces is the key progressive power behind human history, a ‘materialist’ idea that reverses
Hegel’s unfolding of the spirit as the main engine of history. Instead, Weil (2004 [1955])
proposed to take materialism really seriously and thus came to emphasise limits and ener-
getics. She problematised the contradiction between capitalist accumulation, on one
hand, and the limited availability of natural resources and the irreversible degradation
of energy on the other hand (see Georgescu-Roegen, below). ‘[T]o hope that the develop-
ment of science will one day bring about, in some sort of automatic way, the discovery of a
source of energy which would be almost immediately utilisable for all human needs, is
simply day-dreaming’ (Weil 2004, 47). She also noted, anticipating the idea of the Anthro-
pocene, that the industrial society has become a ‘force of nature’ changing the face of the
Earth (Weil 2004, 19).
In her critique of technocratic industrialism, Weil argued that ‘the worker’s complete
subordination to the enterprise and to its managers is founded on the factory’s structure
and not on the system of property’ (p. 40). She criticised Trotsky, both in print and in
person, saying that the Bolshevik élite would become just as oppressive as the capitalists
it was supposed to replace. As an alternative, she advanced the notion of ‘rootedness’ built
around autonomous communities, cooperatives and interconnected smaller production
4Weil was not afraid to use the word ‘soul’ in a metaphysical sense. She was deeply interested in spirituality and read exten-
sively on Christianity, Hinduism (she learned Sanskrit), Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism as well as on ancient Greek and
Egyptian religions.
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units (Weil 2005 [1949]). Such a system would have both collective as well as regulated
private ownership rights.5 Those who work the land, she thought, should be able to
control their plot and manage it themselves. In a way that may sound unfashionable
today, she defended the potential ‘grandeur’ of work, of eﬀorts, seen as a central
element of being in the world and engaging with it, biophysically as well as spiritually.
She did not, thereby, seek to celebrate ‘artisan’ or ‘peasant’ work per se, although she
had a great respect for it, but to radically change the nature of labour, very much along
Marx’s critique of alienation. People should control the process and fruit of their labour,
including the techniques it involves, as in Illich’s (1973) idea of convivial technology.
Weil’s notion of ‘rootedness’ involves the need to be soundly situated in time, space and
social relationships. Many peasants in Europe and the (neo-)colonies, she noted, have been
forcefully uprooted by agriculture’s industrialisation, and those who stay are uprooted too,
through debt, contracts and a widespread ‘inferiority complex’ (Weil 2005, 79). Farming, for
her, should somehow subjectively reclaim ‘the wonderful cycle whereby solar energy,
poured down into plants, […] becomes concentrated in seeds and fruits, enters into Man
[…] and spends itself on preparing the soil’, supporting the sustainable cycle of life
(p. 84). However, Weil refused the conservative forms of rootedness, as expressed in the
‘Land’ or the ‘Nation’. She replaced the Land with the ‘ﬁeld’, and the Nation with ‘friendship’.
Her idea of rootedness is about ‘a re-localisation of eﬀective and aﬀective solidarities’
(Latouche 2016, 116). Rootedness refuses violence and speed, and embraces limits,
cooperation, decentralisation, autonomy, friendship and beauty – the material and immater-
ial ‘necessities’ of a degrowth society (Azam and Valon 2016, 66).
***
Broadly speaking, the problem of limits has been underestimated by Marxist CAS scholars
who have devoted more time and energy to deconstruct ‘green populism’ and/or ‘essenti-
alist ecofeminism’ than to elaborate new and creative insights on viable alternatives. It is not
rare to ﬁnd CAS researchers that seem to be supporting socialist development models that
could not be generalised within planetary boundaries. Bernstein (2010, 300), however,
acknowledged the deﬁciency of CAS on these questions and noted – in a way that would
have pleased Simone Weil – that the ‘“orthodox” materialist conceptions of the develop-
ment of the productive forces in capitalist agriculture’ show ‘an inherited weakness’ when
they embrace ‘such development as forever “progressive”’. Reviewing three decades of
CAS, Bernstein and Byres (2001, 28) recognise that ‘very few contributions engaged with the-
orizing issues of technical change’ and with analysing ‘the ecological conditions of farming
and environmental change’. There is thus, according to Bernstein (2010, 301), an urgent
need to reduce the intellectual deﬁcit of CAS on the relationships between technological
and ecological change, or, in other words, between ‘growth’ and ‘nature’.
Since then, CAS contributions in agroecology, extractivism and the metabolic rift have
expanded, but biophysical analyses and the theorization of broader alternatives remain
scarce. Weis (2010) is among the welcome exceptions in CAS, clearly exposing the ecologi-
cal and social costs of the productive forces in today’s ‘most advanced’ agriculture, and
seeking a way out. In a very degrowth way, he wrote that
5She speciﬁed: ‘The principle of private property is violated where the land is worked by agricultural labourers and farm-
hands under the orders of an estate-manager, and owned by townsmen who receive the proﬁts’ (Weil 2005, 33).
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the need to radically restructure agriculture is at the very core [of] any hope of making the
‘human relation to the earth’ more ecologically sustainable. It is also, simultaneously, at the
core of attempts to build more socially just and humane societies. Agricultural systems
must be vastly more labour-intensive and biodiverse, and geared towards much less meat pro-
duction, as ﬁnite biophysical overrides diminish and in order to reduce the untenable environ-
mental and atmospheric burden of industrial methods. (p. 334)
This does not mean, however, that Weis embraced any version of the agrarian myth, as
‘agrarian social relations have rarely been equitable or even sustainable’ (p. 335). Yet
there is no reason to think that work in urban or rural industries represents a real progress
for the many smallholders who leave the sector. If class and non-class forms of oppression
can be overcome, farm work ‘has an unmatched potential to generate autonomous, skill-
ful, experimental, healthy and meaningful work’ (p. 335).
Table 1 outlines some of the diﬀerences between Marxist CAS and degrowth research.
The purpose of the table is to show strengths/weaknesses on both sides in order to
promote more dialogue and integration. I would like to make the basic point that CAS
and degrowth would gain from considering ‘socialist degrowth’ and hence enrich each
other’s theory and praxis. Along this line, Kallis (2019a) convincingly argued that if social-
ism is serious about curbing the exploitation of ‘the soil and the worker’ (Marx 1867, 638), it
can only go post-growth (see also the entire special issue in Capitalism Nature Socialism on
these questions: Andreucci and Engel-Di Mauro 2019).
In a line pioneered by Simone Weil and others, research in degrowth is an attempt to
move beyond economistic analyses and to include socio-ecological relations as well as
existential questions (Latouche 2009). Accordingly, degrowth research would not only
Table 1. Rough diﬀerences/complementarities between the research agendas of CAS (within the
Marxist tradition) and degrowth.
Research in critical agrarian studies (Marxist)… Research in degrowth…
Focuses on the deployment of capitalism in agriculture and
on its relation with industrial growth and socialism
(Agrarian Question)
Focuses on the deployment of growth(ism) in society and
ecosystems, and on its relation with post-growth politics
(Growth Question)
Debunks the agrarian myth Debunks the (green) growth myth
Sees the development of productive forces and technology
as generally progressive
Sees the development of productive forces and technology
as a central object of critical enquiry
Focuses on the ﬁrst contradiction of capitalism (clash
between capital and labour)
Focuses on the second contradiction of capitalism (clash
between capital accumulation and living conditions
[O’Connor 1988])
Emphasises problems of economic reproduction, especially
through processes of appropriation, production and
distribution
Emphasises problems of socio-ecological reproduction,
especially through processes of extraction, consumption
and excretion (waste)
Problematizes exchange value and abstract labour (as
potentially exploitative)
Problematizes use value and concrete labour (as potentially
meaningless and unsustainable)
Evaluates agriculture’s performance in monetary and
production terms
Evaluates agriculture’s performance in socio-metabolic
terms, including all its ‘side-eﬀects’
Is politically sceptical of ‘the community’ (seen as
diﬀerentiating and hence divided)
Is politically open to ‘the community’ (seen as central to
work and living conditions)
Supports, normatively, agrarian justice initiatives and class
struggle
Supports, normatively, environmental justice initiatives and
preﬁgurative politics as ‘incubators’
Argues that Marx is central in laying out the processes of
capital accumulation, crises and class struggle
Agrees but argues that ‘Marx cannot help much in
understanding cooperation and self-organisation from
below’ (O’Hearn and Grubačić 2016, 148)
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problematise exchange values and abstract labour as potential sites of exploitation; it
would also critically examine the actual usefulness and implications of ‘use values’ (as
in new technologies and products) as well as the existential nature of concrete labour
and community relations. This renewed interest in the quality of use value, work, and
social relations can not only be linked to Weil’s central concerns, but also to Harvey’s
(2014) critique of ‘widespread alienation’ and to Graeber’s (2018) recent take on ‘bullshit
jobs’. To reopen these fundamental questions is essential to the degrowth project and
may, to some extent, resonate with the Chayanovian arts of balancing.
3.2. Alexander Chayanov: the multiple balances of (re)production
Chayanov (1888–1937) was a Russian economist and sociologist who theorised the ‘peasant
economy’ and who, without a doubt, remains one of the most inﬂuential and debated
authors in CAS. Chayanov considered himself a Marxist, along a neo-Narodnik line, and
believed that the ‘peasant economy’ represents a non-capitalist system that requires its
own economic theory. He championed the development of agriculture on the basis of
cooperative peasant households instead of the standard soviet policy of large-scale state
farms. After two arrests followed by ﬁve years in a labour camp, Chayanov was arrested
again in 1937 and executed the same day (Shanin 2009).
Chayanov’s analysis of the family farm cannourish aspects of degrowth theory and praxis
(Garcia 2017). He noted that because the economy of middle peasants is organised outside
the traditional proﬁt/wage couple of capitalism, its economic logic does not purely rely on
quantitative necessities. Instead, it crucially depends on qualitative balances deﬁned within
the family farm and its context. Chayanov (1925) mentioned two key balances: the labour/
consumer and the utility/drudgery balance. They both indicate that labour increases until it
meets the needs of the household, and then it stops, largely because the extra eﬀorts (the
‘drudgery’) are not worth it. There is thus no clear process of accumulation (or growth) as in
the capitalist ﬁrm (see also Sahlins 1972). In other words, the middle peasant family farm has
no inbuilt growth imperative and can potentially live well without it.
Chayanov advanced many hypotheses that could have been investigated further (or
corrected) had he lived longer. A few contemporary scholars – like Teodor Shanin or
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg – have continued this task. Van der Ploeg (2011) has, for
example, identiﬁed several other balances that are essential to the family farm, like the
delicate balance between the farm’s and its ecosystem’s reproduction (a balance also dis-
cussed in Toledo’s pioneering article, 1990) or the balance between internal resources (fos-
tering autonomy) and external ones (fostering dependence). Chayanov (1925) attributed a
strategic importance to the degree of commodiﬁcation of the household and was well
aware that debts or taxes may completely destabilise the family farm. This disruption
may come from the market, but also from the state (as also discussed in e.g. Scott
2009). Ploeg mentioned as well the balance between scale and intensity, between the
short and the long term, between the known and the unknown, between innovation
and conservatism, and between the peasant family and the community. In sum, for the
Chayanovians, farming is about ﬁnding the right balances for fulﬁlling human needs – it
is not necessarily about growing. The resource base of the farm represents an organic
unity controlled by those directly involved in it, but embedded in the broader politico-
institutional-cultural context (Sahlins 1972).
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But Chayanov did not stop at the farm level. He also theorised a cooperative-based
economic system where diﬀerent types of production are associated with their appropri-
ate scale (Chayanov 1927). Forests, for example, can be well managed at the regional level,
pastures at the community level, and salad production at the household level.6 Such a
multiscale model does not follow a dogmatic ‘small is beautiful’ principle (as also noted
by Bernstein 2009) sometimes seen among the proponents of the degrowth movement.
Chayanov’s greatest contribution to degrowth is perhaps to help us imagine an
economy that is free from the fundamental categories of capitalism and simultaneously
based on the popular knowledge of balancing, deﬁning the right scales, and seeking
autonomy (Garcia 2017). But the link with post-growth has never been mentioned by
today’s Chayanovian scholars, probably because it would have been counterproductive
to add another ‘controversial’ topic to their already ‘controversial’ agenda of defending
smallholders and arguing that they can ‘feed the world’ (J.D. van der Ploeg, pers.
comm.). This is unfortunate because degrowth, as we have seen, does not imply that
‘everything’ would need to shrink. While capitalist farming would indeed shrink, other
elements would need to multiply, and very much so, like cooperatives and commons.
***
Like Chayanov’s Russia, Bhutan is today largely an agrarian economy. Agriculture
occupies almost 70 per cent of the population, and among them, middle peasants are
the majority. Bhutan is an important case study for degrowth research, not only
because it may oﬀer a good setting for investigating Chayanovian balances and their evol-
ution, but also because of its alleged ‘new development paradigm’ that is also said to be
about balancing diﬀerent objectives.
Bhutan is one of the last countries to be currently, and probably partially, transitioning
to capitalism. One can thus observe in ‘real time’ processes of diﬀerentiation and resist-
ance as well as persisting ‘traditional’ family farms and artisans whose logic may corre-
spond to a Chayanovian model of slow or no growth. Feudal-like relations of
production (including serfdom and slavery) were abolished between 1953 and 1959. Up
until then, most peasants were owners of their land but heavily taxed in kind and
labour (T. Wangchuk 2001). From the 1960s onwards, Bhutan’s cautious development
has been orchestrated by state planning through a series of ﬁve-year plans. In 2008, the
country became a constitutional monarchy (Phuntsho 2013).
While a small capitalist class has been able to emerge, largely originating from the aristoc-
racy, there are important spheres of the country’s economy that do not seem to follow a capi-
talist logic of production (Basu 1996). Traditional (non-capitalist) institutions are still strong (S.
Wangchuk 2001) and petty commodity production is important. Like in neighbouring Aruna-
chal Pradesh studied by Harriss-White, Mishra, and Upadhyay (2009), Bhutan never experi-
enced an important enclosure movement or widespread rural indebtedness, two key
6In Chayanov’s ﬁrst novel, published in 1920, one can see an outline of his agrarian utopia which combines Narodnik, anar-
chist and socialist-cooperativist elements (Chayanov 1976). It describes a peasant Eden where large cities have been
replaced by a network of rural communities, the industry does not override agriculture, cooperatives have become
the central way of producing and consuming, and the role of the state, while important, is to stay in the background
and to focus on a few key resources like fossil fuels. However, in 1928, Chayanov published another utopian text, The
Possibilities of Agriculture, which takes a completely diﬀerent path and speculates about the future power of industrial
agriculture, oﬀ-ground and without family farms. ‘Such drastic change in ideals could be explained by the change of
political situation in Soviet Russia and the inner decision of Chayanov [who refused to emigrate in 1922–23] to cognitively
cooperate with the Soviet regime’ (Raskov 2014, 11).
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mechanisms which would have accelerated processes of social diﬀerentiation (Gerber 2014).
The countryside is largely free from large-scale agribusiness investments and from a promi-
nent class of commercial landlords.7 The introduction of a full-ﬂedged market economy
could thus be unrealistic in these conditions, and this could be Bhutan’s greatest chance, if
only the situation is correctly understood and creatively used.
Despite a tight dependency on the Indian economy, Bhutan is trying to avoid some of
the negative consequences of neoliberal globalisation. The government has thus invited
various post-growth thinkers to provide advice (RGoB 2013).8 The results so far contain
contradictory but also inventive elements. On one hand, Bhutan’s GDP has been
growing at a fast rate over the past three decades, but largely because of a series of
growth peaks following important state-run hydroelectric projects (Mitra and Jeong
2017). On the other hand, the country has put in place a number of policies limiting
GDP growth and seeking to enhance welfare and sustainability. One can cite: free edu-
cation and healthcare; severe restrictions on foreign investments; no WTO membership;
no outdoor advertising; heavy taxes on car imports; limits on mass tourism (and ban on
alpinism); limits on mining; half of the country under protected areas; constitutional 60
per cent of forest cover; declared willingness to generalise organic agriculture.
Bhutan has also developed the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH) which has
attracted a lot of attention. GNH was formalised after a particularly ‘unhappy’ period in the
country’s history. In the late 1980s, Bhutan’s external situation was tense: its debts to India
were swelling while India had turned neoliberal around 1990 and annexed Sikkim in 1975
(following strong anti-monarchy movements). Fearing a possible loss of sovereignty, the
Bhutanese government sought to reinforce the Buddhist Ngalop identity shared by
much of the élite (western Bhutan), to the detriment of other groups in the country,
especially the Hindu Lhotshampa minority (southern Bhutan). A violent crisis followed,
leading to the eviction of thousands of Lhotshampas out of the country (Hutt 2003; Phunt-
sho 2013). GNH began to enter the country’s policy arena about a decade after these
events, partly as a resistance to neoliberal globalisation threatening existing structures,
and partly, possibly, as an attempt to rebuild the country’s image but also to alleviate
many internal wounds (Phuntsho 2013).
Today, GNH remains a contested notion. It encompasses diﬀerent interpretations, more or
less radical (Gerber and Raina 2018a). For some Bhutanese, GNH is a loosely-deﬁned ‘green
growth’ and a brand name to ﬁt every occasion. For others, GNH is synonymous with the
GNH Index, a sophisticated indicator seeking tomeasurewell-beingholistically9 and intended
to replace GDP in guiding development policies (Ura et al. 2012). And still for others, albeit a
minority, GNH is not just a new indicator but a philosophy of social ﬂourishing integrating
7As a result, characteristically, the government has been unable to ﬁnd a Bhutanese labour force willing to carry out unplea-
sant work like road construction, and the necessary workforce of landless peasants is hired from India.
8Some of their contributions can be found here: http://www.newdevelopmentparadigm.bt/2013/11/29/contributions-to-
the-ndp-report/ (accessed on 18 February 2019).
9The GNH Index is based on nine domains – i.e. living standards, education, health, environment, community vitality, time-
use, psychological well-being, good governance, and cultural resilience and promotion – measured with 33 ﬁne-tuned
indicators. The indicators have suﬃciency thresholds which are benchmarks of ‘how much is enough’ for a ‘good life’.
They are based on international or national standards, normative judgements, or the outcome of participatory meetings.
Concretely, a GNH Screening Tool has been implemented to help the GNH Commission – a powerful committee orches-
trating the economy’s planning process – in assessing policies and projects for their compatibility with the GNH Index
(Hayden 2015).
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outer and inner needs and seeking suﬃciency with respect to economic growth – a position
that gets close to degrowth provided it is egalitarian and democratic (Hayden 2015).
One of the main architects of GNH, Karma Ura, wrote that ‘it is possible that a GNH state
is analytically diﬀerent from socialist, liberal or free market states. [Our] strategy [is] to take
the country from being a late starter in modernization directly to a sustainable society’ (Ura
2005, 1–5). More research is needed to substantiate this claim – that Chayanov would
probably not have rejected – and clarify the nature of growth and post-growth in
Bhutan, from the family farm to the state level.
3.3. Joseph Cornelius Kumarappa: decentralisation and autonomy
Kumarappa (1892-1960) was an Indian economist, the founder of ‘Gandhian economics’,
but an original theorist in his own right and a man of action. After studying economics
in London and at Columbia University in New York, he joined the Indian nationalist move-
ment in the 1920s. He was in charge of Gandhi’s schemes of village reconstruction and
helped create and run the All India Village Industries Association (AIVIA), the organisation
that was intended to promote and actualise Gandhi’s economic ideas (Kumarappa 1951).
His extensive travels, many surveys, and work with AIVIA gave him a deep understanding
of the conditions of rural India. Among his numerous books, Why the Village Movement
(1936) and Economy of Permanence (1946) – written while in jail for more than a year
during the Quit India period – are arguably his best known publications, and they inspired
several of the forefathers of degrowth, including Ivan Illich and Ernst Schumacher. At the
heart of his views lie the concepts of autonomy, non-violence, and the idea of a ‘natural
order’ to be cared for, and deﬁned as a moral web of connections between all sentient
and insentient beings. These concepts serve as the ontological foundation for his critique
of the moral and material dimensions of industrial modernity.
In a nutshell, his theory and praxis can be seen – at their mature stage – as an eﬀort to
promote a decentralised and self-suﬃcient economy that would abolish class and caste
distinctions and that would seek to keep the emancipatory possibilities of modernity while
building on the strengths of peasant and artisan production (Govindu and Malghan 2017).
His focus on the village economy was thus, as he speciﬁed, ‘no ancestor worship’
(quoted in Govindu and Malghan 2017, 9), but an attempt to protect the autonomy and
dignity of the Indian villager by enabling control over his or her own economic destiny.
Similarly to Chayanov, Kumarappa proposed the model of an agrarian economy that
would rebalance the countryside and cities, based on the smallest possible scale at
which a decentralised economy could fulﬁl the basic needs of its members. Accordingly,
he suggested regional units of 100,000 people with ‘balanced cultivation’ of cereals,
pulses, vegetables, dairy, and so on, ensuring a daily diet of about 3000 calories and
cotton for making clothing. He recognised that some sectors such as the railways had
to be centralised and was also aware of the limitations of existing practices in the
village economy, but for him ‘[t]he remedy is not to abandon cottage units but to bring
the light of science to cottage workers’ (Kumarappa 1936, 110).
Any reformulation of modernity – like in the degrowth movement today – has to begin
by examining the notion of ‘standards of living’. For Kumarappa, ‘high’ vs. ‘low’ standards
are repeatedly not describing a gradation in the quality of life but a diﬀerence between
‘complex’ vs. ‘simple’ material standards where ‘complex’ ones are artiﬁcially created by
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the market and tend to undermine suﬃciency and autonomy. Both capitalist and state
élites, he argued, shape for their own beneﬁts normative ideals of what constitutes the
‘good life’, ideals that one has to question radically. Kumarappa was critical of deriving
market prices from individual preferences and proposed instead that valuation standards
had to be found at a deeper level, in the moral economy. The distance between the pro-
ducer and consumer hinders the moral assessment of an exchange, he observed, and this
is one of the key reasons behind his defence of local production and consumption. More-
over, he noted that an economy that encourages unrestricted accumulation is antithetical
to the ‘natural order’, thereby clearly resonating with degrowth.
A critic of AIVIA ridiculed its approach, calling it ‘a cloak of tattered patches’ that
stitched Kumarappa’s ‘economic notions’ together with ‘elements of Ruskin, William
Morris, Proudhon, Bakunin and Tolstoy… [to] try to furnish a swadeshi [“made in India”]
alternative to the imported ideas of socialism’; Kumarappa simply replied that indeed
‘certain aspects of our reasoning can be paralleled from anarchists and others but that
is not suﬃcient cause to hang us’ (quoted in Zachariah 2005, 191, 193). Kumarappa’s
work refutes the common assumption that degrowth ideas are an invention of industrial-
ised countries. He anticipated by several decades many contemporary notions on the
topic, and the Left is slowly rediscovering the relevance of his thought (Guha 2006;
Gerber and Raina 2018b). Shrivastava and Kothari’s (2012) ‘radical ecological democracy’
could be seen as a contemporary take on some of Kumarappa’s core ideas. But as it is
often the case with ‘pro-peasant’ thinking, right-wing farmers’ movements have also
sometimes misused Kumarappa’s idea for their own purposes (see e.g. Brass 1995).
***
Are there today networks of agrarian communities that would embody elements of
Kumarappa’s ideas and exemplify degrowth in practice? Would the Amish of North
America be a candidate? The Amish form a network of religious and mostly agrarian muni-
cipalities which hold simplicity and mutual aid as core values and reject many aspects of
capitalist modernity. They represent without a doubt a rich and complex experience that
degrowth theory and praxis can learn from. Because ‘after all,’ wrote Daly (2000, 72), ‘any
group that can make a good living from small farms for a century without government aid
and without mining the soil might be doing something right’.
In the sixteenth century, Anabaptism – the theological foundation of the movement –
was a radical ideology, ‘the left wing of the Reformation’, which was seen by Kautsky
(1895) as the apex of medieval communism. The ﬁrst Anabaptists were urban intellectuals
in Zurich who rejected state-based religion and advocated paciﬁsm, egalitarianism, com-
munity life, the free religious choice of adults (against the baptism of children) as well as a
return to the New Testament. After intense persecutions (due in part to revolutionary lean-
ings during the German Peasant War), the movement became agrarian and a number of
schisms divided them into various orders of Mennonites, Hutterites and Amish.
Unlike the Hutterites, the Amish do not collectivise their resources nor do they pool
their income. They engage in local entrepreneurial capitalism and may hire labourers,
mostly from within the community. Class diﬀerentiation is thus visible and economic
inequality has appeared within the communities. According to Hurst and McConnell’s
(2011, 213) survey, ‘nine out of ten [Amish respondents] considered the accumulation
of personal material wealth to be a threat to the internal harmony of the community’.
This was seen as conﬂicting with their adoption of simplicity as a core principle through
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plain cloths, organic farming and a selective rejection of modern technology (like cars,
tractors, radios, TV, internet). This does not mean, however, that all modern technologies
are rejected. Electricity is produced locally and used for refrigerators, lamps and sewing
machines. In a way that would certainly please Kumarappa, every new technology,
before being adopted, gives rise to careful discussions supported by an exegesis of the
sacred texts. Marglin (2008, 255) argued that the key criteria when discussing technology
is the extent to which it might undermine the community: ‘It is clearly a balancing act’, he
wrote, and not an easy one, as ‘Amish communities have fractured on the issue of tech-
nological choice’.
In order to balance their commitment to simplicity with their insertion into the
wider society, the Amish make a useful distinction between ownership and access
(Kraybill, Johnson-Weiner, and Nolt 2013). Amish households may for example rent
the services of a non-Amish driver to deliver goods, or if they have a stand in a large
market house, they may use the lights and refrigeration made available to them by the
building’s non-Amish owner. ‘Some observers see hypocrisy in this use-but-don’t-own
approach, but the Amish see a deep consistency’, argued Nolt (2014, 79). Private owner-
ship of technology, from an Amish perspective, quickly runs against the community as
it promotes unnecessary individualism. In contrast, to have to pay for access to
services or technology is rooted in the ideal of co-dependence, humility, and practical
limits, seen as a healthy way of being in the world, but it also allows some ﬂexibility in
terms of technological use. It is of course debatable to what extent the Amish are self-
reliant and autonomous, as much beneﬁt seems to be gained from their insertion in the
larger world.
The same remark applies to many neo-rural intentional communities – with various
degrees of political radicalism – that have been looking for an alternative, simpler, and
self-suﬃcient lifestyle free from wage labour. They are, without a doubt, present in the
degrowth movement, and this is why Calvário and Otero (2014, 143) described back-to-
the-landers as ‘actors of a diversiﬁed strategy of socio-ecological change towards a
degrowth future’. While these experiences could be theorised as ‘incubators’ for larger
transformations (see below), some authors have argued that alternatives that reinforce
the notions of consumer (like food) sovereignty, state failure, and self-reliant ordered com-
munities are in fact reproducing neoliberal subjectivities and practices (see e.g. Guthman
2008; Argüelles, Anguelovski, and Dinnie 2017); others have argued that by remaining
local and by not targeting state power, ‘from below’ alternatives are basically toothless
if not counterproductive (see e.g. Brass 2014).
Research on degrowth has little choice but to go back to these old questions that
continue to divide Marxist and anarchist orientations. Community economies like the
Amish raise important Kumarappan questions about ‘the ongoing negotiations between
the individual and the community, between freedom and regulation, and between tra-
dition and modernity’ (Halteman 2014, 250), as well as between genders, classes, and
between growth and no-growth.10 A Science article on the energetics of Amish agriculture
concluded that
10The Amish are not quite degrowthers when it comes to population expansion as their birth rate is very high. Bernstein
(2010) convincingly suggested tackling the leftist taboo of population growth more openly, while Martínez-Alier (2009)
explicitly connected feminist neo-Malthusianism with degrowth (Masjuan and Martínez-Alier 2004).
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The Amish experience should make us more conﬁdent about the future if [fossil] energy
should become progressively scarcer. It is often said that the Amish provide a vignette of
early America; is it also possible that they may provide an image of the future? (Johnson,
Stoltzfus, and Craumer 1977, 378)
3.4. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen: the solar economy
Georgescu-Roegen (1906-1994) was a Romanian-American mathematician and economist
who is seen as the father of ecological economics and a key intellectual inﬂuence in the
degrowth movement. After studying statistics in Bucharest, Paris and London, he spent a
short but decisive time at Harvard where he became the protégé of Joseph Schumpeter.
Harvardwas a vibrant place at the time and his colleagues includedWassily Leontief, Nicho-
las Kaldor, Paul Samuelson, Paul Sweezy and Oskar Lange. Schumpeter oﬀered him a pos-
ition in 1936 and asked him to work with him on a book, but Georgescu-Roegen declined
and decided to return to Romania to ‘help his native land become a happier place for all’
(Georgescu-Roegen 1992, 132). It is in the Romanian agrarian economy of the interwar
period that Georgescu-Roegen truly discovered economic problems. From 1937 to 1948,
he held several important posts in the government, but after the victory of the Stalinists
and the following repression, he managed to ﬂee to Turkey with his wife and then to the
United States, where he stayed until the end of his life, mostly at Vanderbilt University.
His work on agrarian economies (Georgescu-Roegen 1960, 1965) signalled the begin-
ning of his radical epistemological critique of economics based on the principles of ther-
modynamics, ecology and the role of institutions. In agreement with Chayanov (whom he
quoted in 1960, some years before he was revived and translated in the West), Georgescu-
Roegen argued that the theories of capitalism – whether neoclassical or Marxist – do not
neatly apply to non-capitalist economies. The latter have their own institutions that one
has ﬁrst to understand. Of course, it is still possible that propositions coming from the
diﬀerent theories of capitalism are relevant to them, but the validity of each proposition
must be empirically reconﬁrmed. The diﬃculty of building a general analytical framework
for agrarian economies, he argued, mainly stems from their immense variability.
Like Chayanov, however, Georgescu-Roegen suggested a few general principles of
agrarian economies. The one that is perhaps the most relevant to degrowth relates to
the agriculturalist’s dependence on biotic resources, which have a radically diﬀerent
potential than mineral resources. From this, Georgescu-Roegen developed what
became the central idea of his magnum opus, The Entropy Law and the Economic
Process (1971), namely that the common terms of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’
obscure the Lavoisian fact that nothing is created or destroyed in the economy, but every-
thing is transformed. The second law of thermodynamics – the entropy law – tells us that
energy always tends to be degraded to ever poorer qualities. Accordingly, economic pro-
cesses irreversibly transform valuable (low entropy) natural resources into valueless (high
entropy) waste and emissions.
There are mainly two sources of low entropy available to humans: the ﬁnite stocks of
mineral resources like fossil fuels and the ﬂow of solar radiation that will be available to
us for another four billions of years. Whereas stocks can be extracted at high rates, solar
energy arrives at a constant and ﬁxed rate, beyond human control. This natural asymmetry
helps explain the historical opposition between urban and rural life: the frenetic pace of
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modern cities is associated with industrial growth fuelled by mineral resources, while the
slower tempo of rural life is associated with a zero or slow growth structured around the
reception of solar ﬂow. Given that biotic resources depend on the cyclical rhythms of
nature, they cannot be used continuously and this explains why economic activities in
agrarian economies must be diversiﬁed. In contrast, the ﬂow of mineral resources from
stocks (e.g. oil) allows an industrial organisation of production in line, which makes it poss-
ible to use production funds at their full capacity and to have specialisation (Georgescu-
Roegen 1969).
Georgescu-Roegen showed that the mechanisation of agriculture is unsustainably
mimicking the industrial logic: machinery, chemical fertilisers and pesticides all rely on
mineral resources, rendering modern agriculture – and the industrialised food systems
associated with it – as dependent on non-renewable stocks as the industrial sector. This
is, Georgescu-Roegen (1975, 373) explained, ‘in the longrun a move against the most
elementary bioeconomic interest of the human species’. The implications for sustainability
are thus clear and radical: the kind of economic growth that is needed is not a stationary
one – as his student Herman Daly was already arguing in 1971 – but a ‘declining’ or a
degrowing one (1975, 369). Georgescu-Roegen suggested a utopian ‘minimal bioeco-
nomic program’ in eight points: after opening all borders and equalising the conditions
to ‘arrive as quickly as possible at a good (not luxurious) life’ for everyone, the global objec-
tive is to ‘gradually lower [the world’s] population to a level that could be adequately fed
only by organic agriculture’ (1975, 378; see also Martínez-Alier 1997).
***
Any glimpse into aspects of such a transition is worth examination, and Cuba’s Special
Period of the 1990s could be one such instance. It represents ‘the largest conversion from
conventional agriculture to organic and semi-organic farming that the world has ever
known’ (Murphy 1999, 9). For almost a decade, it involved deep socioeconomic changes
and, unlike other similar crises like the Russian, it succeeded in some important respects
that could echo elements of a degrowth transition (Boillat, Gerber, and Funes-Monzote
2012; Borowy 2013).
By 1989, Cuban agriculture was a showcase of the Green Revolution, heavily relying on
one crop – sugarcane – and importing 60 per cent of its food. While this model guaranteed
a good standard of living to the Cuban population, it was dangerously dependent on the
Soviet Union, politically authoritarian, and ecologically quite destructive. After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Cuba brutally lost 85 per cent of its trade relations. Many industrial
complexes closed, and transportation and electricity consumption were reduced to a
minimum. In brief, the crisis forced the Cubans to take seriously Georgescu-Roegen’s
ideas (although the Cuban leadership probably never mentioned him), namely to
produce and consume locally, to refrain from credits, to replace tractors with oxen,
agro-chemicals with bio-pesticides, industrial fertilisers with compost, machinery with
manual labour, long-distance with face-to-face communication, and, above all, to live a
simple, low-consumption lifestyle (Borowy 2013).
Large state farms were transformed into cooperatives, the Basic Units of Cooperative
Production (UBPCs), seen as more ﬂexible, but it turned out diﬃcult to convert farm
workers into peasants, and the UBPCs have had mixed results. The peasant families
who own the land and group together in cooperatives to share farm machinery proved
to be much more rapidly adaptable to the crisis than the UBPCs and other collective
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farms. The facts that decisions are taken at the family level and that ‘their members typi-
cally exhibit a strong sense of belonging to, and caring for, the land’ (Rosset et al. 2011,
167) made them initially very quick and very open to alternative ecological methods.
The growth of urban agriculture and gardening is also a well-known outcome of the
crisis (Altieri et al. 1999), and so was the movement of city dwellers to the countryside, sup-
ported by the government, to reinforce organic production. Cuban authorities took several
other measures (e.g. legalisation of the dollar, boost of tourism) that were ‘conservative’
since their goal was to get back to a more standard growth model. In any case, by the
end of the 1990s, the acute agricultural crisis was over, while food was being produced
with much less inputs and equipment. What is more, Borowy (2013) documented surpris-
ing improvements in public health indicators including maternal and infant mortality,
obesity, and mortality from diabetes, tumours, strokes and external causes. The ‘degrowth
period’ brought about lifestyle changes with tangible health beneﬁts.
It is encouraging to see how Cuba has been able to substitute fossil fuels with renew-
able energy and with positive eﬀects on health and sustainability. But one should not
ignore the important role of a solid welfare state and a low level of inequality, which
would make the generalisation of the Cuban successes diﬃcult. Also, the Special Period
was never intended as the beginning of a new era and the country is now back on the
track of economic growth, largely based on tourism. However, agroecological production
is still thriving in a context where food continues to be partly imported (Machín Sosa et al.
2013; IPES 2018).
Georgescu-Roegen’s goal was to be as rigorous as possible when assessing ecological
sustainability. His recommendations were accordingly oriented towards a downscaling of
the social metabolism rather than towards ‘Green New Deals’ that promote a world-scale
transition to renewable energies but without emphasising the need for a diﬀerentiated
reduction in levels of consumption. Such proposals – like Pollin’s (2018) one, which is
also an unfortunate attack on degrowth – are quickly biophysically naïve and end up
justifying the ideology of growthism that created the problems in the ﬁrst place. For
Pollin, degrowth is ‘utterly unrealistic’ and the Left cannot aﬀord to dream that another
world is possible given the urgency of climate change. ‘We are [thereby] asked to
accept’, remarked Kallis (2019b) in his reply to Pollin, ‘that the only game in town is capit-
alism, and that questioning capitalism and its destructive pursuit of growth is a luxurious
waste of time. If not now, then when, one might wonder?’ Biophysically speaking and with
current technologies, a wind-hydro-solar economy could only support much smaller econ-
omies, and a transition to renewables would therefore have to be a degrowth transition.
3.5. Joan Martínez-Alier: the politics of degrowth
The Catalan economist and political ecologist Joan Martínez-Alier (1939-) is one of the
most inﬂuential ﬁgures of the degrowth movement and a former board member of JPS.
There are a number of similarities between his intellectual path and Georgescu-
Roegen’s. Like the latter, he spent more than a decade studying agrarian economies,
especially in Spain, Cuba and Peru; and like Georgescu-Roegen, agrarian questions led
him to be interested in ecological sustainability and conﬁrmed his dissatisfaction with
the ‘Leninist’ lens to apprehend rural problems – a dissatisfaction sustained by his own
anarchist sympathies. In an observation that echoes Georgescu-Roegen’s (1965) views
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on the great diversity of rural institutions, Martínez-Alier (1974, 158) wrote that ‘the variety
of rural social formations makes it diﬃcult to accept that anything very speciﬁc can be said
about peasant politics in general’. Much more than Georgescu-Roegen, however, Martí-
nez-Alier has been interested in grassroots conﬂicts over processes of exploitation, dispos-
session and contamination. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he studied struggles over
agrarian production relations11 and he is engaged today in the immense work of compil-
ing a global inventory of ecological distribution conﬂicts (see www.ejatlas.org).
In the Peru of the early 1970s, Martínez-Alier became for the ﬁrst time in contact with
indigenous peasants who explicitly rejected a certain modernisation and fought to pre-
serve their traditions, communities and identities – something that would resonate with
post-development theory a decade later. In addition, it is in Peru that he began to
immerse himself in ecological questions, at ﬁrst through the ecological anthropology of
Andean peasants, and later on, through the untold history of agricultural energetics and
ecological economics in general. The resulting book (Martínez-Alier 1987) provided an
intellectual lineage to the nascent ﬁeld of ecological economics.12 The book’s epilogue
politicises socio-metabolic analyses, criticises the ‘the belief in economic growth’ (p.
236), and puts forward ‘ecological neo-Narodnism’ – later called the ‘environmentalism
of the poor’ – a neglected current of environmentalism that became his research and
activist focus for the next three decades, culminating in another inﬂuential volume in
2002 (Martínez-Alier 2002).
This current of environmentalism – also referred to as the environmental justice move-
ment – combines ecological concerns and social justice. It literally ﬁghts the impacts of
economic growth and their unequal distribution. The environmentalism of the poor
typically involves impoverished, working-class or indigenous populations, struggling
against the state or the corporate sector. The Chipko movements against state plantations
in India, the Seringueiros against large-scale ranchers in Brazil, and the Ogoni struggle
against Shell in Nigeria are emblematic cases of this current. Taken as a whole, the
myriads of such conﬂicts on extraction, transport and waste disposal represent one of
the most powerful socio-political forces in the global South today, and they are on the
rise as the metabolism of industrialised regions requires ever more energy and materials
(see e.g. Gerber 2011; Martínez-Alier et al. 2016; Conde 2017; Scheidel et al. 2018).
However, this massive mobilisation strength has arguably failed, so far, to translate
into an equal theoretical strength, despite the fact that many creative concepts have
been forged through socio-environmental activism, such as the ‘ecological debt’,
‘climate justice’, ‘biopiracy’, ‘food sovereignty’ or ‘land grabbing’ (Martínez-Alier et al.
2014). This is not to say, also, that environmental justice movements lack broader con-
ceptual frameworks – like buen vivir or swaraj – that may inﬂuence their interpretation
of problems and guide alternative projects (Kothari et al. 2019). Yet, overall, many
11One of Martínez-Alier’s main interests was in sharecropping that he described as ‘akin to piece-work’ (Martínez-Alier 1983,
94). He argued that sharecropping tends to be more proﬁtable for the landlord than wage labour because it rests on both
class exploitation and the peasants’ self-exploitation. Sharecropping is thus neither ‘ineﬃcient’ (from a conventional per-
spective) nor ‘semi-feudal’ (from a certain Marxist perspective).
12With José Manuel Naredo, Martínez-Alier rediscovered the work of Sergei Podolinsky in agricultural energetics and
Engels’ rather negative reaction to it (Martínez-Alier and Naredo 1982; Martínez-Alier 2011). Podolinsky was a Ukrainian
Narodnik Marxist who could have, they argued, bridged Marxism and ecology for the ﬁrst time in a systematic way (but
see Foster and Burkett 2016, for a diverging opinion). Podolinsky was critical of industrial agriculture on energetics
ground. He understood agriculture as a system of energy transformation and was familiar with thermodynamics.
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grassroots movements remain local and narrow in their conceptual scope. The resulting
fragmentation can obstruct wider synergies and the broader societal alternatives that
can be imagined and constructed. This is why Martínez-Alier (2012) suggested that
there is an important potential alliance between the large global environmental justice
movement and the ideas of the emerging degrowth movement. He has promoted this alli-
ance on analytical grounds – i.e. there is a convergence of material interests between
the two movements – but also on normative grounds, as degrowth can oﬀer a
radical political project to environmental justice.
***
Martínez-Alier emphasises concrete socio-ecological struggles as key sites where
‘degrowth’ demands are being formulated. For him, such conﬂicts are ‘degrowth in practice’,
since they de facto seek to prevent growth from taking place, be it in the form of a new
highway, a new power plant, a new plantation, or more contamination with industrialisation.
But is it the case that environmental justice movements and degrowth are natural allies?
A recent special issue in Ecological Economics explored this relationship and revealed
diﬀerent opinions (Akbulut et al. 2019). Some authors argued that there is a clear
aﬃnity between the two movements. Alcock (2019, 267), for example, analysed the
New Rural Reconstruction Movement (NRRM) in China and argued that ‘the links
between the sources of degrowth and NRRM theory as well as how that theory is put
into practice mean that the NRRM can be seen as a type of degrowth movement’. Refuting
the charge of western-centrism, the author calls for radical knowledge co-production by
scholar-activists aware of ‘the speciﬁcs of diﬀerent countries and localities’. Similarly,
Forst (2019) reviewed First Nations sovereignty and environmental struggles in British
Columbia, Canada, and found that ‘many of the core and repeated aims found within
Degrowth conversations parallel grassroots First Nations goals’ (p. 140).
In contrast, some authors have been more sceptical about the ‘naturalness’ of the alli-
ance. Rodríguez-Labajos et al. (2019) argued that there are ‘signiﬁcant diﬀerences’
between the two movements and that the policies proposed by degrowthers are often
perceived as western-centric (like reducing working time). More attention should therefore
be placed on the speciﬁcities of places and histories before any substantial alliance can be
built. Scheidel and Schaﬀartzik (2019) wrote that environmental justice protesters and
degrowthers have not exactly the same aims: while the former often seek to protect ‘tra-
ditional livelihoods and ways of living’, the latter seeks ‘new livelihoods and new ways of
living, within alternative societies’ (p. 332). Many grassroots resistance movements may
indeed start with the defence of a local status quo, hence the normative quest for a
radical theory able to transcend this. The key point, from a degrowth perspective, is to
transform NIMBY movements (not in my backyard) into NIABY movements (not in
anyone’s backyard) actively seeking broader transformations.
Muradian (2019, 257), for his part, argued ‘that the degrowthmovement reﬂects the values
of a particular social group, namely the well-educated European middle class that share pro-
gressive-green-cosmopolitan values’, a situation that ‘creates signiﬁcant barriers for its disse-
mination among lower-income social groups in other parts of the world’. If one deﬁnes
degrowth as an undiﬀerentiated call for ‘voluntary frugality’ for all, then such ideaswill under-
standably not speak to many people. The present article has, hopefully, oﬀered a diﬀerent
view on what degrowth is all about. Having said this, I can only agree with Muradian that
degrowth is still largely today a white middle-class movement of the global North. Yet
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Marx and Engels were alsowhitemiddle-classNortherners. If it took some time forMarxism to
establish some connections with the world’s working class, could it be that it will also take
some time for degrowth (or other labels for the same ideas) to establish some connections
with various agrarian, urban and environmental justice movements?
Vía Campesina seems hesitant to endorse degrowth, but this does not mean that things
will not change (Martínez-Alier 2011). In 2014, for example, the movement wrote a petition
that was clearly degrowth-oriented, saying that ‘we need to replace capitalism with a new
system that seeks harmony between humans and nature and not an endless growth
model that the capitalist system promotes in order to make more and more proﬁt’
(quoted in Roman-Alcalá 2017, 119). Similarly, degrowth ideas are still rarely discussed
among workers’ organisations. Yet again, a clear pro-degrowth stance appeared in the
French Confédération Nationale du Travail (CNT) in 2011: ‘the defense of the environment
implies the ﬁght against capitalism; our labour class union is ecologist and in favour of
degrowth’ (quoted in Bayon 2014, 273).
Kallis (2018) suggested a Gramscian framework for understanding the dialectical role of
the state and the grassroots in a degrowth transition. For him, grassroots alternatives, little
by little, generate a counter-hegemony that inﬂuences the ‘common sense’:
Alternative economies are not then just microcosms or preﬁgurations of a degrowth world.
They are incubators, where people perform every day the alternative world they would like
to construct, its logic rendered common sense. […] As they expand, they undo the
common senses of growth and make ideas that are compatible with degrowth hegemonic,
creating the conditions for a social and political force to change political institutions in the
same direction. (p. 138, his italics)
In turn, alternative policies open space for new alternative practices that reinforce the new
common sense in a kind of virtuous cycle.
The point here is to emphasise that grassroots alternatives are essential but insuﬃcient
in themselves (Buch-Hansen 2018). After a certain point, food sovereignty, to take just one
example, faces structural constraints (Kallis 2018): it is limited by access to land, by legislative
rules that prioritise agribusinesses, by price dumping, or even by the erosion of the welfare
state and the rising costs of health or education, which may all push people towards more
proﬁtable cash crops monocultures. In the necessary upscaling process, ‘bottom-bottom’
networks for environmental and agrarian justice (Borras and Franco 2018) could become
platforms where a new ‘common sense’ and new ‘bottom-up’ post-growth politics and
policies could emerge. But more empirical research is needed, as I will propose next.
4. A research agenda on agrarian degrowth
It is clear that […] capitalist expansion has now nearly reached the point where it will be halted
by the actual limits of the earth’s surface. […] We are in a period of transition; but a transition
towards what? – Simone Weil (1933, 3)
As here, Levien et al.’s (2018) introduction to a JPS special issue on agrarian Marxism con-
cluded with suggestions for future research. In their penultimate paragraph, the authors
wrote this:
Finally, there is the question of socialism itself, and [of] socialist alternatives, experiments and
praxis. This draws something like a blank in contemporary Marxian analysis. It’s all very well to
254 J.-F. GERBER
dig back into Russia in the 1920s, or Maoism in the 1960s, but there is not much that is forward
looking. (p. 878)
That contemporary Marxian research has little new to say about ‘forward looking’
socialism is indeed quite dismaying, and it seems clear that this should
constitute the starting point of a degrowth research agenda in CAS. We need to
go back to the messiness of concrete practical-political ‘alternatives, experiments
and praxis’.
The vignettes presented in this article were intended as stimulants for further research
on such ‘experiments’. I will now try to identify more systematically what a research
agenda in ‘agrarian degrowth’ could look like. The suggested lines of inquiries follow
the deﬁnition of the Growth Question I proposed above.
4.1. What are the eﬀects of growth and who beneﬁts?
The political economy/ecology of growth is a fundamental area of future research in
‘agrarian degrowth’, an area that would immediately speak to both CAS and degrowth
scholars. In what ways has growthism – be it neoliberal, social-democrat or communist
– shaped the countryside? To what extent has it lessened/increased ‘poverty’? What
kind of ‘wealth’ does it create and for whom? ‘[India’s] pattern of dazzling economic
growth’, noted Walker (2008, 561), ‘has been propelled by a powerful “reinforcing mech-
anism” through which “inequality drives growth and growth fuels further inequality”’. Such
mechanisms must be clariﬁed in order to demystify the current common sense that
growth ultimately leads to more welfare.
4.2. What are the limits to (agrarian) economies and how to deal with them?
The extractive and commodity frontiers are another big topic for research in ‘agrarian
degrowth’. These frontiers epitomise the ever shifting ‘limits to growth’ and they
need more theoretical and empirical investigations. Does agroecology represent a
way to stay within planetary boundaries? The kind of agriculture that would match a
degrowth society needs to be conceptualised more rigorously. Infante Amate and Gon-
zález de Molina (2013, 32) suggested a degrowth strategy for agriculture and food based
on four ‘Rs’: ‘Re-territorialization of production, re-localization of markets, re-vegetaria-
nisation of diet, re-seasonalisation of food consumption’ (see also Altieri and Toledo
2011). Gomiero (2018), for his part, argued that biotech-based agriculture such as
genetically modiﬁed crops are not suitable for a degrowth society. Building on these
initial eﬀorts, research in agrarian degrowth needs to develop appropriate socio-meta-
bolic approaches (see e.g. Padró et al. 2019), and reversely, analyses of the social metab-
olism must be enriched with CAS insights into its politico-institutional determinants
which are often grossly under-incorporated (Gerber and Scheidel 2018). More research
on the socio-political metabolism of rural systems would represent the royal road for rig-
orous assessments of what is possible/desirable to maintain over the long term. Giam-
pietro and Mayumi (2015), for example, used a state-of-the-art metabolic approach to
investigate biofuel production and end up with a demolition of the ambitions of
large-scale biofuel production from agricultural crops.
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4.3. What are the alternatives and who will support them?
How do social movements – agrarian, indigenous or environmental – ‘undo’ growth in
practice? How do they contest (if at all) the capitalist growth imaginary? How likely are
they to become the ‘natural’ allies of the degrowth movement? A systematic study of
the alternative narratives and practices that emerge from these movements would be
much needed (see e.g. Holt-Giménez 2010; Martínez-Alier et al. 2016; Borras 2019).
In a world where the vast majority of those working in agriculture are ‘small’ farmers,
what can degrowth learn from pre-, semi-, non- or anti-capitalist smallholders? What is
the place of ‘small’ farmers in a degrowth transition? What kind of politico-institutional
context would make them ‘degrowth-compatible’? (see e.g. Paech 2012). The central
Kumarappan ideas of autonomy, decentralisation and simplicity are to some extent prac-
ticed in contemporary ‘community economies’ (see e.g. Gibson-Graham 2006). How and
under what conditions may their successes be scaled up? And more generally, what can
degrowth learn from the anthropology and history of non-capitalist and non-growing
economies?
The Cuban experience with ‘degrowth’ also relates to the role of crises, which needsmore
attention. Crises of capitalism must be understood, as Moore (2015) emphasised, in the fra-
mework of its total conditions of reproduction, including the contradictory relations of
capital and nature. Ecological crises are thus likely to also play a major role in generating
alternatives. How do rural economies adapt to crises like resource depletion or recessions?
‘Involuntary declines are not degrowth in themselves, and countries in recession or
depression are not degrowth experiments, unless communities make a virtue out of neces-
sity, building low-impact livelihoods that enhance wellbeing and equality’ (Kallis et al. 2018,
302). This is an important area for further research in ‘agrarian degrowth’, with plenty of
possible ﬁeldwork sites, from Greece to Venezuela. Under what conditions do crises
reinforce authoritarian populism instead of creative responses like in Cuba of the 1990s?
CAS is in a strong position to examine some of the key proposed policies for degrowth –
such as those concerned with commoning, decommodiﬁcation, post-extractivism and
resource extraction caps, debt audit, and tax and subsidy reforms. What can we learn
from past and current implementations? ‘Reclaiming the commons’, for example, is a stra-
tegic point for many land-based social movements; but to what extent do they thereby
succeed in transcending capitalist relations of private property and reconnect inhabitants
with their territories? If a viable post-capitalist degrowth alternative is to be organised, new
ownership institutions will need to be designed (Gerber and Steppacher 2017). For Harvey
(2015, 60), ‘the long-range perspective is to displace private property arrangements by
greater and greater degrees of commoning […] including in some instances the creation
of alternative common property rights or even non-markets rights’. Along a similar line,
Amin (2017, 156) argued that a transition to socialism requires an agrarian reform not
based on standard private property. What Harvey and Amin have in mind here is the
necessity to design post-capitalist ownership arrangements that do not foster the same
deleterious dynamics as capitalism.
Another crucial example of degrowth policies to be investigated from an ‘agrarian
degrowth’ perspective concerns the organisation of work. Reductions of working hours,
in particular, are included in all major degrowth scenarios (Latouche 2009; Kallis 2018;
Schmelzer and Vetter 2019). They are meant to prevent unemployment in non-growing
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economies and free up time for reproductive, social, creative and recreational activities.
Yet small-scale and organic agriculture typically requiresmorework (Sorman and Giampie-
tro 2013). Woodhouse (2010, 451) summarised the issue as follows: ‘While there is evi-
dence that smaller-scale production is more eﬃcient in terms of energy use, it generally
involves lower labour productivity, and hence lower earnings, than either large-scale agri-
culture or non-farm work’; in this context, can small-scale organic farmers survive without
non-farm activity and hence without losing autonomy? How is work to be organised in
post-growth agriculture?
Finally, new (and old) values are said to be expressed in various alternative initiatives like
the slow food movement, permaculture, vegetarianism/veganism, radical homemakers,
back-to-the-landers, alternative conceptions of the good life, eco-spiritualities, etc. What is
the broader political potential of these initiatives and movements? To what extent are
they ‘incubators’ for further and deeper transformations, or simply the object of new
forms of commercialization? Are we witnessing the uneven but overall encouraging emer-
gence of a ‘new consciousness’ (see e.g. Dussel 2018) for which the current spread of author-
itarian populism is just a conﬁrmation in reverse? Can this new consciousness (revealed also
in the sudden growth of environmentalism among young people, including their school
strikes and mass demonstrations) come into alliance with the revival of indigenous militancy
in many areas of the world around ecological and cultural issues? Values of respect for
nature and sacredness of nature are frequently claimed by indigenous peoples and also
by peasants. About 40 per cent of all environmental conﬂicts registered in the EJAtlas
(almost 3000 cases by October 2019) are led at least partly by indigenous people (J. Martí-
nez-Alier, pers. comm.). Is this new consciousness the foundation for a degrowth transition?
5. Concluding remarks
The less you are and the less you express your life; the more you have and the greater is your
alienated life. […] Everything which the economist takes away from you in terms of life and
humanity, he replaces for you in the form of money and wealth. – Karl Marx (1988 [1844],
119, his italics)
One should distinguish between a myth as a false idea and a myth as a conveyor of sym-
bolic meanings. Even if the agrarian myth and the myth of growth are factually untenable,
they may nonetheless both symbolise very real needs to resist the alienating tendencies of
capitalist modernity. The agrarian myth is a tale of lost harmony with one another and with
nature, while the myth of growth could be seen as a compensation for the impossibility to
‘express our lives’, as Marx’s quote alludes to. If this is true, then the Left should take these
two myths seriously, as an unconscious expression of distress, and should gently help
people see where and how these fundamental needs can be actualised in the real
world. Degrowth could be a direction of choice for that.
This article argued that CAS and degrowth can enrich each other, not only in the pro-
blematization of the causes, nature and eﬀects of capitalist growth in agriculture, but also
in the empirical analyses of alternative experiences and proposals at diﬀerent levels. I par-
ticularly focused on the work of one philosopher and four agrarian economists which, in
my view, can show what a research and activist agenda in ‘agrarian degrowth’ might look
like (even if these authors did not necessarily intend to do so). Simplifying their
respective contributions to the extreme, one could say that Weil oﬀers fragments of a
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rooted consciousness for degrowth, Chayanov suggests basic elements for a
degrowth economy, Kumarappa theorises a governance for degrowth, Georgescu-
Roegen oﬀers its ecological foundation, while Martínez-Alier provides an initial political
subject/movement.
All ﬁve thinkers became critical of capitalism, of large-scale industrialisation and of politi-
cal centralisation – but none of them became dogmatically localist or anti-technology. All
ﬁve authors have been inﬂuenced by Marx – but all of them have followed their own
path, often highly critical of oﬃcial communist party lines. All ﬁve, except Georgescu-
Roegen, have expressed anarchist sympathies. All ﬁve, except Chayanov, have praised
agroecological practices and/or the ecological soundness of ‘traditional farming’. And
they would possibly all ﬁve doubt that wage labourers are more easily radicalizable than
smallholders when it comes to getting involved in what they regard as progressive politics.
Having said this, all ﬁve thinkers may underestimate the extent to which petty
commodity producers are entrenched – consciously or not – in capitalist relations of pro-
duction, for example through various forms of debt arrangements. Thirty years ago, Utsa
Patnaik (1979, 1981) wrote a critique of Chayanov’s Theory of Peasant Production (1925)
complaining that the book is blind to class relations and broader systemic considerations.
She also criticised Georgescu-Roegen along the same line, and her points were largely
valid as Georgescu-Roegen’s article of 1960 (that she was concerned with) is indeed
weak on class. One can only regret that Georgescu-Roegen (1981) did not take the oppor-
tunity of his reply to Patnaik, surprisingly short and awkward, to agree with at least some of
her points, but to add that CAS would gain from taking ecological relations as seriously as
social relations. This would not only reinforce the critique of capitalism and the elaboration
of viable alternatives; it would also help bring closer CAS and degrowth.
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